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Abstract. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising cryptographic prim-
itive that allows one-to-many encryption. In such a system, users’ private keys are
linked to their access rights. We note that if a user can generate a new private key
for a portion of his/her access right, this could potentially lead to some undesir-
able situations, which violate the access control policy. Interestingly, to date, there
is no work that looks into this matter in detail nor addresses it. We point out that
this is a “property” that exists in ABE systems, which we refer to “key-delegation
abuse”. ABE systems that suffer from key-delegation abuse will hinder the adop-
tion of these systems in practice. In this work, for the first time in the literature, we
address the “key-delegation abuse” problem in Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based
Encryption (CP-ABE) systems. We introduce a new mechanism to enhance CP-
ABE schemes that provide protections against this key-delegation abuse issue.
We formalize the security requirements for such a property, and subsequently
construct a CP-ABE scheme that satisfies the new security requirements. We also
present an application of our scheme to a traceable CP-ABE, where the “traitors”,
i.e. the users who have leaked their keys, can be traced.
Keywords: Attribute-based encryption, Key-delegation abuse, Ciphertext-policy
1 Introduction
In modern cryptography, one of the most promising cryptographic primitive is the no-
tion of Attribute-based Encryption (ABE), which allows one-to-many encryption. In
this notion, there are two variants, namely Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryp-
tion (CP-ABE) and Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption (KP-ABE), which essen-
tially denotes the location of the embedded access policy, whether it is in the ciphertext
or in the key. In this work, we mainly discuss CP-ABE. In CP-ABE, a ciphertext on
a message is encrypted with an access policy while a private key for a user associated
with a set of attributes corresponding to the private key satisfying the access policy.
The basic security in CP-ABE requires that a user cannot generate a new private
key for an attribute set ω′ from a private key set for ω, if ω ⊂ ω′. It is an interesting
question whether the reverse is also true. That is, whether the key generation for the
reversed subset relationship also holds this property. Interestingly, this important issue
receives a very limited attention in the literature. Specifically, the question is: given a
private key for attribute set ω, can the user generate a new private key for any subset
ω′ ⊂ ω? We note that if the answer is positive, this can lead to some undesirable situ-
ation. To illustrate this situation, consider the following scenario. A media broadcaster
(who is the trusted authority in the cryptographic setting) controls the contents to its
subscribers by encrypting the contents with a CP-ABE system. Without losing general-
ity, the contents will be encrypted with an attribute set as follows: {Sport, Biography,
Drama,Comedy,Action, Thriller, Fantasy, Sci-Fi,Documentary,War}. Note
that there are ten attributes in the possible set in this example. Each possible channel
is sold for $10/month, and hence, it will cost $100/month to subscribe to all channels.
To make the package deal more attractive, the media broadcaster introduces a premium
user package. For a premium user package, the user needs to subscribe to all chan-
nels, and hence the ten attributes, and the premium user will be granted two additional
channels, namely {HD,Hollywood−movies}, and the premium price is $100/month
for the whole package. Consider the case where a malicious user, Malva, purchases
the premium package. If the CP-ABE scheme that is adopted allows Malva to create a
new private key for any attribute, which is a subset to the original attribute set that he
has, then Malva can make money from this case. He will then construct a private key
for the attribute Sport for example, and sells this for $9/month, and for the ten possi-
ble attributes, he will accrue $90/month. Additionally, he can sell any combinations of
the attribute sets (such as {Sport, Fantasy}) and again sell it at a cheaper price than
$20/month. Note that in total, he will make more than $100/month by simply re-selling
a combination of these channels. We should point out that in this case, it is clear that
Malva will be able to manage his own groups of customers with private keys of differ-
ent sets of attributes and in fact, Malva has functioned as an illegal “trusted authority”,
who will compete with the original media broadcaster. Throughout this paper, we shall
call this “property” in ABE as the key-delegation abuse, if the adversary can generate a
private key for any subset without revealing his/her entire access rights. It is clear that
this property is undesirable in some scenarios, as outlined above.
Interestingly, the property of key-delegation abuse exists in majority of CP-ABE
schemes since private keys are usually designed with flexibility in order to meet the
requirement of complex and variable access policies in the ciphertexts. As a result, dif-
ferent components of a private key are used for different access policies, which makes
it possible for a user to split his/her private key to different parts and construct new pri-
vate keys from these parts or parts from other users. To the best of our knowledge, the
key-delegation abuse problem in ABE systems is still not yet well explored in the liter-
ature, and hence, it becomes an inherent problem in ABE. For the key-delegation abuse
problem, existing solutions combine users’ private information with their private keys
so that malicious users are wary of constructing new private keys based on theirs and
introduce an extra trace device/algorithm to pinpoint malicious users from constructed
new private keys. However, these approaches have two limitations: 1) they gave a de-
terrent solution, while users are still capable to issue new private keys; and 2) they need
the constructed new key to trace who the malicious user is.
Our goal in this work. The aim of this work is to address the key-delegation abuse
problem. In particular, we aim to make the notion of ABE to be more adoptable in
practice, once the problem with key-delegation abuse is removed.
Our contribution In this paper, for the first time we propose a ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption scheme in which users cannot illegally generate new private keys of
a subset of the users’ original sets of attributes. The access structure used in our CP-
ABE is constructed by an AND-gate. This is a subset of the access structures used in
[3,15]. In our scheme, a ciphertext with the access structure W , which consists of a
single AND gate whose input are attributes described by an access policy attribute set
W , can only be decrypted by a private key of a set of attributes ω when W ⊆ ω. Our
technique can be summarized as follows. We utilize the property of bilinear groups.
Then, we construct private key components for all attributes but based on two different
sets of group elements as if it is contained in the set of attributes of the private key
or not. Subsequently, we apply the secret sharing scheme on all attributes, and enforce
the bilinear map of key components and ciphertext components for all attributes so that
the key cannot be split nor combined with other private keys. We prove the security
properties of the scheme in standard selective model. We also introduce a new security
game based on [5] for the key-delegation abuse problem and prove the new feature
of our scheme in generic group model. Additionally, we present an application of our
scheme to achieve a traceable CP-ABE scheme, where traitors can be traced efficiently.
Organization The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2, we discuss related work. Sec.
3 provides some background definitions and main properties of ABE system. In Sec. 4
our CP-ABE construction is presented, and the security proof is presented in Sec. 5. In
Sec. 6, we discuss an application of our scheme to achieve a traceable CP-ABE scheme.
Finally, in Sec. 7, we conclude with some discussions and future work.
2 Related work
The concept of Identity-based Encryption (IBE) was put forth by Shamir [19] in order
to ease public-key encryption and certificate management. Specifically, there is no ne-
cessity to verify the validity of users’ certificates, as users’ public key is in fact their
identities, such as e-mail addresses or phone numbers. An encryptor can create a cipher-
text under the receiver’s identity without any prior information. Subsequently, Sahai
and Waters [18] proposed the notion of Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) by replacing
the identity in IBE with an attribute set. ABE has been found very useful in providing
fine-grained access control systems [6]. Subsequently, many flexible and efficient ABE
schemes have been proposed in the literature. As classified by Goyal et al. [6], there
are two variants of ABE, namely KP-ABE and CP-ABE. In a KP-ABE, ciphertext is
associated with attribute sets, and each user private key is associated with an access
structure that specifies which type of ciphertexts the key is able to decrypt. In contrast,
in a CP-ABE system, each user’s key is associated with an attribute sets and ciphertext
will specify an access policy over attributes. Therefore, the difference between CP-ABE
and KP-ABE relies on who determines the access control policy in the encryption sys-
tem. In a CP-ABE, when a message is being encrypted, it will be associated with an
access structure over a predefined attribute sets. The user will only be able to decrypt a
given ciphertext if his/her attributes satisfy the access structure specified in the cipher-
text. The first KP-ABE construction [6] realized the monotonic access structures for
key policies. To enable more flexible access polices, Ostrovsky et al. [17] developed a
KP-ABE scheme to support the expression of non-monotone formulas in key policies.
However, KP-ABE is less flexible than CP-ABE because in KP-ABE once a user’s pri-
vate key is issued the access policy is also determined, which makes the encryption
more difficult as the encryptor needs to compare recipients’ access policies to all other
users’ to choose a proper set of attributes for the ciphertext. Later, Bethencourt et al. [9]
proposed the first CP-ABE construction. However, the construction [9] was only proved
secure under the generic group model. To overcome this weakness, Cheung and New-
port [3] presented another construction that is proved to be secure under the standard
model. Then, Goyal et al. [4] presented another construction for more advanced access
structures based on number theoretic assumption. Katz, Sahai, and Waters [10] pro-
posed a novel predicate encryption scheme supporting inner product predicates. Their
scheme is very general and can achieve both KP-ABE and hidden CP-ABE schemes.
However, the constructions of [2,10] are very inefficient compared to [16].
In [7], Hinek et al. mentioned the problem of key cloning, and another third party
should be involved in each users decryption in their scheme, which makes it impractical.
Then, the problem of building a secure CP-ABE supporting traceability has recently
been studied in [8,12,14,13]. The ciphertext access policies in [8,12] only support a
single AND gate with wild-card. The traceable CP-ABE proposed in [14] is as fully
secure, highly expressive and efficient as a conventional CP-ABE such as the one in
[11], but it only supports tracing ’well-formed’ illegally constructed private keys. Later,
[13] proposed a new CP-ABE scheme proved fully secure which can trace not ‘well-
formed’ illegally constructed private keys. However, traceability cannot prevent “key-
delegation abuse” issue – malicious users can still illegally generate keys in private.
2.1 Violating Access Control Policy with “Key-Abuse” Property
The key-delegation abuse property is that a user who owns a private key for attribute
set ω can generate a new private for a subset ω′ ⊂ ω. This property exists in majority
of CP-ABE schemes. In the following, we shall demonstrate that this key-delegation
abuse property can lead to some undesirable situation where the access control policy
is violated.
Without losing generality, we shall consider the Cheung and Newport scheme pro-
posed in [3]. Cheung and Newport proposed a CP-ABE scheme [3] (which is referred
to as the CN scheme throughout this paper), in which access structure is restricted to
an AND gate, but attributes i are allowed to be either positive i, negative ¬i or “don’t
care”. In their system, let the attribute universe be N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, then the public
key is PK = (G = 〈g〉, e : G×G→ GT , Y = e(g, g)y ∈ GT , {Tk = gtk}k=1,...,15),
and the master secret key is MK = (y, t1, . . . , t15 ∈ Zp). A private key for attribute
set ω = {1, 2, 3} is
skω =
(
D̂ = gy−r, {Di = g
ri
ti }i=1,2,3, {Di = g
ri







ri. To encrypt a message M with AND gate W = (1 ∧ 2) we have
C =
(
W, C̃ = MY s, Ĉ = gs, {Ci = T si }i=1,2, {Ci = T s10+i}i=3,4,5
)
.
To decrypt ciphertext C, only part of the private key
(




















Thus, the user who owns skω can generate a new key
sk′ =
(
D̂′ = D̂, {D′i = Di}i=1,2, {F ′i = Fi}i=1,...,5
)
to decrypt ciphertexts with AND gate (1), (1 ∧ 2), (2) or ∅ since sk′ satisfies the de-
cryption algorithm.
From the example, it can be seen that to decrypt ciphertexts with different access
policies, different parts of a private key are used during the decryption, which makes it
plausible to illegally generate new keys. This property of key-delegation abuse does not
break the security of encryption schemes and sometimes is adopted for applications like
key delegation. However, unauthorized key generation can lead to violation of access
control policy.
3 Background
We first give formal definitions for the security of Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based En-
cryption (CP-ABE). Then we give background information on pairings and complexity
assumptions.
3.1 Access Structure[3]
Generally speaking, an access structure on attributes is a rule A that returns either 0
or 1 given an attribute set ω. We say that ω satisfies A iff A answers 1 on ω. Access
structures may be Boolean expressions, threshold trees, etc.
In this paper, we focus on access structures that consist of a single AND gate whose
inputs are attributes. This is denoted A =
∧
i∈W i, where W is a subset of the universal
attribute set and every i is an attribute. Given an attribute set ω, A answers 1 iff for all
i ∈W , i ∈ ω. Thus, ω satisfies A iff W ⊆ ω.
3.2 CP-ABE Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system consists of four algorithms: Setup,
Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
Setup. The setup algorithm takes no input other than the implicit security parameter. It
outputs the public parameters PK and a master secret key MK.
Encrypt(PK, M , A). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters PK,
the message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. It will
output a ciphertext CT such that only users whose private keys associated with
attribute sets which satisfy the access structure A can decrypt M . We assume that
the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(MK, ω). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret MK
and a set of attributes ω. It outputs a private key sk associated with ω.
Decrypt(PK, CT , sk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters
PK, a ciphertext CT , which contains an access structure A, and a private key
sk, which is a private key for a set of attributes ω. If the attribute set ω satisfies
the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a
message M.
Selective CPA Security Model. We now give the security definition for CP-ABE sys-
tem. This is described by a security game between a challenger and an adversary. The
game proceeds as follows:
Init The adversary outputs a challenge access structure A∗ to the challenger.
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to
the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets of
attributes ω1, . . . , ωq1 without any satisfying the access policy A∗.
Challenge The adversary declares two equal length messages M0 and M1. The chal-
lenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ with A∗, producing CT ∗.
It gives CT ∗ to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets of
attributes ωq1+1, . . . , ωq with the same restriction in Phase 1.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be Pr[β′ = β]− 12 .
Definition 1. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system is selective chosen-
plaintext attack secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in this security game.
Security Model against Key-Abuse Attack We now give the security definition against
Key-Abuse Attack in CP-ABE system. This is described by a security game between
a challenger and an adversary. The game is formalized based on [5] and proceeds as
follows:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK
to the adversary. The attribute universe U and message spaceM are also defined
during this step.
Queries The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to differ-
ent sets of attributes ω1, . . . , ωq ⊆ U . In response, for each query ωj for 1 ≤ j ≤ q
the challenger runs KeyGen(MK,ωj) to compute the private key skj , and send it
back to the adversary A. A can query the challenger adaptively.
Output The adversary chooses a new attribute set ω∗ 6= ωj for 1 ≤ j ≤ q, generates
a new private key sk∗ for attribute set ω∗, a new general decryption algorithm
Dec∗(PK,CT, sk), and send them to the challenger.
The adversary wins if
1. Dec∗(sk∗,Enc(PK,M,A) = M for all A =
∧
i∈W i, W ⊆ ω∗ and any message
M ∈M.
2. For all possible decryption algorithm Dec′(sk∗,Enc(PK,M,A)) outputs⊥ for all
W 6⊆ ω∗ and any message M ∈M .
The advantage of A is defined to be the probability that A wins the security game.
Definition 2. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system is secure against
Key-Abuse Attack if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advan-
tage in this security game.
3.3 Pairings and Complexity Assumption
Bilinear Groups We briefly review the bilinear maps and bilinear map groups[1].
Let G,GT be cyclic groups of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G. We say
G has an admissible bilinear map, e : G × G → GT , into GT if the following three
conditions hold:
1. Bilinearity e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b.
2. Non-degeneracy e(g, g) 6= 1.
3. Computability e(ga, gb) for all ga, gb ∈ G can be computed efficiently.
Complexity Assumption We state our complexity assumption below.
Definition 3. (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption). Suppose a chal-
lenger chooses a, b, c, z ∈ Zp at random. The Decisional BDH assumption is that no
polynomial-time adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple (A = ga, B = gb, C =
gc, Z = e(g, g)abc) from the tuple (A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z = e(g, g)z) with more
than a negligible advantage.
4 CP-ABE construction
In this section, we shall present our CP-ABE scheme. For simplicity, let the universe of
attributes be U := {1, ..., n} for some natural number n.
In our construction the key generation algorithm will link the key components of
one user with a specific set of group elements, and then apply the secret sharing tech-
nology to all attributes, so that the key cannot be split or combined to obtain other
workable secret keys. Each private key will be generated including one key component
per attribute: if the user owns this attribute the key component will be generated with
the set of group elements of ti; otherwise, generated with the set of group elements of
tn+i. The encryption algorithm will take as input an AND gate and distribute a ran-
dom exponent r ∈ Zp according to all attributes: if an attribute is included in the AND
gate there will be only one ciphertext component for this attribute generated with the
set of group elements hi for decryption; otherwise, two ciphertext components for this
attribute will be generated with hi and hn+i.
Setup(λ,U) : Given a security parameter λ and an attribute universe U of size of n, the
setup algorithm first chooses a bilinear group G of prime order p. It then chooses
random numbers t1, . . . , t2n, α ∈ Zp, random group generators g0, h0 ∈ G, and
computes
Y = e(g0, h0)
α, h1 = h
t1
0 , . . . , hn = h
tn
0 , hn+1 = h
tn+1
0 , . . . , h2n = h
t2n
0 .
The public parameters PK are PK = (h1, . . . , h2n, Y, e,G,GT ,U). The master
secret key MK is MK = (g0, t1, . . . , t2n, α).
Enc(PK,M,A) : To encrypt a message M ∈ GT with an access structure A =∧
i∈W i the following steps are taken. A random value r ∈ Zp is chosen uniformly.
The ciphertext is then created as:
CT =
(
A, E′ =MY r, {Ei = hri }i∈W , {Ei = hrn+i, E′i = hri }i∈U\W
)
.
KeyGen(MK,ω) : To generate a private key for attribute set ω ⊆ U the following
steps are taken. n− 1 random values x1, . . . , xn−1 are randomly chosen in Zp and
compute xn = α− x1 − · · · − xn−1 ∈ Zp. The private key for the attribute set ω:
sk =
(
ω, {Di = g
xi
ti






Dec(PK, CT , sk) : Suppose that a ciphertext, CT , is encrypted with an access struc-
ture A =
∧
i∈W i and we have a private key for attribute set ω, where W ⊆ ω.



























































We shall prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the DBDH assumption holds, our CP-ABE scheme defined in Section 3
is secure in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof. To prove the theorem, let us assume that there is an adversary A that can break
our CP-ABE scheme with non-negligible probability. We show how to use this adver-
sary to construct an algorithm B which breaks the DBDH assumption.
For the algorithm B breaking the DBDH assumption, we let the challenger set
the groups G and GT of prime p with an efficient bilinear map, e and generator g.
The challenger then flips a fair binary coin µ independent of B’s view. If µ = 0
the challenger sets (A,B,C,Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc); otherwise (A,B,C,Z) =
(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z). At a high level, our simulation works as follows. We build a sim-
ulator that simulates the joint distribution consisting of adversary’s view in its attack in
the security game, and the hidden bit β which is not a part of the adversary’s view.
We will show that if the input comes as µ = 0, the simulation will be perfect, and so
the adversary will launch its full ability breaking our CP-ABE. We will also show that
if the input comes as µ = 1, then the adversary’s view is independent of β, and there-
fore the adversary’s advantage is negligible. This immediately implies B distinguishing
the distribution of its input tuple: run the simulator and adversary together, and if the
simulator outputs β and the adversary outputs β′, B outputs µ = 0 if β = β′, and 1
otherwise.
We now give the details of the simulator.
The input to the simulator is (p,G,GT , e, g, A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z).
Init During the Init phase, the simulator receives the challenge access structure A∗ =∧
i∈W∗ i, where W
∗ ⊆ U , from the adversary A.
Setup First simulator chooses random numbers υ, ν, λ1, . . . , λn, γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Zp.
Next, the simulator computes
g0 = g
υ, h0 = g
ν , hi|i∈U = gνλi = hλi0 ,
hn+i|i∈ω∗ = Bνγi = hbγi0 , hn+i|i∈U\ω∗ = gνγi = h
γi
0 ,
Y = e(A,B)υν = e(g0, h0)
ab.
Since hi = hti0 and hn+i = h
tn+i
0 for each attribute i ∈ U , the simulator sets
ti := λi ∈ Zp for each attribute i ∈ U , tn+i := bγi ∈ Zp for each attribute i ∈ ω∗
and tn+i := γi ∈ ZN for each attribute i ∈ U \ ω∗. Since Y = e(u0, v0)α, the
simulator also sets α := ab ∈ Zp.
The simulated public parameters are PK = (h1, . . . , h2n, Y, e,G,GT ,U). The
master secret key is MK = (g0, t1, . . . , t2n, α).
Phase 1 The adversaryAmakes private key queries. The simulator responds to a query
on ω, whereW ∗ 6⊆ ω, as follows. Observe that there must exist an attribute k ∈W ∗
such that k 6∈ ω. The simulator first chooses such an attribute k. Next, the simulator
chooses x′1, . . . , x
′





Then the simulator sets xi := bx′i for each attribute i 6= k ∈ U and xk := ab+ bx′k
for the attribute k.
Finally, the simulator computes


































and passes sk = (ω, {Di}i∈U ) onto A.





xi + xk = b
∑
i 6=k,i∈U
x′i + ab+ bx
′
k = ab.
Challenge The adversary A outputs messages M0,M1. The simulator generates a bit
β ∈ {0, 1} and sends A the challenge ciphertext:
CT ∗ =
(
A∗, E′ =Mβ · Zυν , {Ei = Cνλi = hic}i∈W∗ ,
{Ei = Cνγi = hcn+i, E′i = Cνλi = hci}i∈U\W∗
)
.
Phase 2 A makes key generation queries, and the simulator responds as in Phase 1.
Guess Finally, the adversary outputs guesses β′. If β = β′, B outputs 0 indicating that
Z = e(g, g)abc; otherwise, it outputs 1.
Perfect Simulation: When µ = 1 and Z = e(g, g)abc, we have
E′ =Mβe(g, g)
abcυν =Mβe(g0, h0)
abc =M · Y c.
Thus, CT ∗ is a valid ciphertext for A∗, and the public key and challenge cipher-
text issued by the simulator comes from a distribution identical to that in the actual
construction; however, we still must show that the private keys issued by the sim-
ulator are appropriately distributed. To show that the keys issued by the simulator
are appropriately distributed, it suffices to show that, from A’s view, the value ga, gb
is uniformly random and independent. But this follows from the fact that ga, gb is
chosen uniformly random in G from the input.
Probability Analysis: We assume the adversary A breaks our CP-ABE scheme with
non-negligible probability ε. If Z = e(g, g)abc, then the simulation is perfect, and
A will guess the bit β correctly with probability 1/2+ ε. Else, Z = e(g, g)z is uni-
formly random in GT , and thus E′ is uniformly random and independent element
inGT . In this case, with probability 1−1/p the value of β is independent fromA’s
view. Thus, we have that
Pr[B(A,B,C,Z) = 0]− Pr[B(A,B,C,Z) = 0] ≥ ε− 1/p.
This concludes the proof of Theorem. 
Theorem 2. Our CP-ABE scheme is secure against Key-Abuse Attack (in the sense of
Definition 3) in the generic group model.
Proof. We briefly discus the high level idea of the here. A full security proof is given
in Appendix A.
High Level Idea
In the generic group model, the adversary can only manipulate group elements by using
the canonical group operations, independent of the encoding for group elements. Thus
if the adversary is given group elements gδ1 , . . . , gδt ∈ G as its only inputs, then each
element ofG output by the adversary must be of the form gπ(δ1,...,δt), where π is a fixed
multilinear polynomial.
Suppose the adversary gives a new private key sk∗ with a decryption algorithm
Dec∗(·) for an attribute set ω∗, with which ciphertexts encrypted with A∗ =
∧
i∈ω∗ i
can be decrypted. Using a standard argument for the generic group model, we first
show that if this is to happen with non-negligible probability, then the multi-linear
polynomials as described above in the new private key must also satisfy correspond-
ing constraints. Thus our approach is to assume that the multi-linear polynomials cor-
responding to the adversary’s output satisfy the required constraints, and then obtain a
contradiction. We proceed by arguing that in order to satisfy the constraints, the poly-
nomials must have certain structure (i.e., they can only depend on certain given group
elements).
First, for a ciphertext CT encrypted under A∗ =
∧
i∈ω∗ i the new private key can
decrypt M from E′ if it can be used to compute Y r = e(g0, h0)αr. Thus, it contains a
group element in G for each attribute in U to pair the corresponding Ei (or E′i) in the
ciphertext in bilinear map. We denote these group elements by D∗i for attribute i in U
and the necessary structure of the new private key can be presented as (ω∗, {D∗i }i∈U ).
After narrowing down the necessary construction for sk∗, we note that D∗i needs
to be constructed based on key components D(j)i from j-th queried private key sk
(j)
for attribute set ωj since there is no other given group elements related to the unknown
master secret key α for the adversary. Nevertheless, we also note that because of the
difference of the queried attribute sets, for the same attribute i the key components
D
(j)
i might be generated based on different sets of group elements, which makes them
irreconcilable to be combined together. Thus, the new private key sk∗ can only depend
on one queried private key skj where ω∗ ⊂ ωj . But this will result in that sk∗ can
be used to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with ωj that is an attribute set beyond the
supposed ω∗, which contradicts the second condition in the security game’s definition.
6 Application: Traceable CP-ABE
In this section, we shall discuss an application of our CP-ABE scheme to realize a
traceable CP-ABE scheme, which is a CP-ABE scheme that is equipped with a traitor
tracing mechanism. The main purpose of traitor tracing in ABE system is to guaran-
tee that any user who illegally shared his/her private key can be traced. Many works
have explored traceability in ABE schemes [8,12,14,13]. Most of them focused on
tracing new keys generated in collusive way, but few can prevent one user gener-
ating new workable keys in private. Based on our “key-delegation abuse” resistant
CP-ABE scheme, we can obtain a Traceable CP-ABE system that can trace privately
generated illegal new keys with an extended attribute universe. Each user is given
an attribute set that consists of attributes from the original attribute universe, which
present his/her access right, as well as attributes from the extended attribute set, which
indicate his/her identity. To be specific, we first let the original attribute universe be
U := {1, . . . , n} and a user identity space be I of size of 2l, and we have the extended
universe U ′ := {1, . . . , n + l} in which attributes {1, . . . , n} are used for describing
access right and attributes {n+1, . . . , n+ l} are used to indicate identities. Next, when
a private key for an attribute set ω (which only consists of attributes {1, . . . , n}) and
a user identity ID is queried, the user’s identity ID is mapped to a distinct binary
string LID ∈ {0, 1}l by a collision-resistant hash function. According to the identity
binary string LID, if the k-th digit is 1 the corresponding (n + k)-th attribute is added
into a dummy attribute set ωID. The private key is then generated based on attribute
set ω′ = ω ∪ ωID. Since the decryption algorithm of our CP-ABE scheme requires
corresponding key components for all attributes in the extended universe and our CP-
ABE scheme is key-delegation abuse resistant, a user who wants to share his/her private
key needs to give away the whole key, which will also give away the unique dummy
attribute set. Thus, if a private key is shared, then the user will be traceable.
Using this technique, we can now describe our traceable CP-ABE construction us-
ing our key-delegation abuse resistant CP-ABE scheme ΠKARCP−ABE = (Setup
KAR,
KeyGenKAR, EncKAR, DecKAR) as follows.
Setup(λ, I,U) : Given a security parameter λ, a user identity space I of size of 2l and
an attribute universe U of size of n, the setup algorithm first sets the new universe
U ′ := {1, . . . , n + l}. Next, it runs SetupKAR(λ,U ′) to get the master secret key
MKKAR and the public parameters PKKAR of ΠKARCP−ABE . Then it chooses a
collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. Finally, it sets the public
parameters PK = (PKKAR, H), and the master secret key MK =MKKAR.
Enc(PK,M,A) : To encrypt a message M ∈ GT with an access structure A =∧
i∈W i the encryption algorithm publishes CT = Enc
KAR(PKKAR,W,M).
KeyGen(PK,MK,ω, ID) : To generate a private key for attribute set ω ⊆ U and a
user identity ID ∈ I the following steps are taken. First, compute the identity
binary string LID = H(ID) and store the tuple of 〈ID,LID〉 into an internal list
in the Trace algorithm. Then, a dummy attribute set ωID is generated by adding
(n + k)-th attribute if k-th digit of LID equals to 1. Finally, it outputs skω,ID =
KeyGenKAR(PKKAR,MKKAR, ω ∪ ωID).
Dec(PK, CT , skω,ID) : Suppose that a ciphertext, E, is encrypted with a set of at-
tributeW and a private key has an access right of the attribute set ω, whereW ⊆ ω.
Then, the message is recovered as M = DecKAR(PKKAR, EW , skω,ID).
Trace(PK, sk′) Let sk′ =
(
ω′, {D′i}i∈ω′ , {D′i}i∈U ′\ω′
)









i, hn+i) = Y . Then, reconstruct the
user identity binary string LID′ ∈ {0, 1}l by setting k-th digit to 1 if (n+ k) ∈ ω′;
otherwise 0. Next, search the internal list for a tuple 〈ID,LID〉whereLID = LID′
and reveal the corresponding ID as the identity of the traitor.
Theorem 3. If the DBDH assumption holds, our Traceable CP-ABE scheme defined in
Section 3 is secure in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 1, and hence, we omit it.
Theorem 4. Our Traceable CP-ABE scheme is secure against Key-Abuse Attack (in the
sense of Definition 3) in the generic group model.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2, and hence, we omit it.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated an important property in ABE schemes, which we call as
the “key-delegation abuse”. When an ABE scheme is not key-delegation abuse resistant,
it means that the private keys that the users have will allow those users to generate new
set of private keys without the need of the trusted authority’s involvement. To be more
specific, the new derivative keys can be generated for attribute set ω′ from a private key
set for ω, if ω′ ⊂ ω. We outlined some severeness of this situation in practice, and we
also pointed out that the existing schemes in the literature suffer from this problem. It
is indeed interesting that this issue has not been well studied in the literature despite
its importance for the adoption of ABE in the real situation. In this work, we proposed
a security notion for the key-delegation abuse property and presented a new CP-ABE
scheme that is key-delegation abuse resistant. We also proved the security of the scheme
in both of standard selective CPA model and the proposed model. Additionally, we also
presented an extension of our CP-ABE scheme to a traceable CP-ABE scheme, which
will allow the “traitors” to be traced in the system. Our scheme is the first CP-ABE
scheme that is key-delegation abuse resistant. For the future work, it will be interested
to construct a key-delegation abuse resistant ABE scheme that is based on standard
hardness assumption.
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We consider two random encodingsψ0, ψ1 of the additive group Zp respectively,
that is injective maps ψ0, ψ1 : Zp → {0, 1}L, where L > 3 log(p). We write G =
ψ0(x) : x ∈ Zp,GT = ψ1(x) : x ∈ Zp. We are given oracles to compute the induced
group action on G,GT and an oracle to compute a non-degenerate bilinear map e :
G×G→ GT . We refer to G as a generic bilinear group.
We now proceed with the proof, following the standard approach for generic groups
with ψ0, ψ1, G,GT defined as above. Let g = ψ0(1)(we will write gx to denote ψ0(x),
and e(g, g)x to denote ψ1(x)).
For any generic-group adversary, the security game against key-delegation abuse
is considered carried out by a simulator as follows. For each group element seen or
created by the adversary, this simulator keeps track of its discrete logarithm by means
of a multivariate rational functions in the following indeterminate formal variables:∑
= {υ, ν} ∪ {ti}i∈U ∪ {x(j)i }i∈U,j∈[q].
The simulation also associates each group element with some rational function. For
each distinct rational function in its collection, it inputs the value of the rational function
to corresponding encoding ψ0 or ψ1 and gives the result to the adversary as the encoding
of that particular group element. The functions are associated with the group elements
in the simulation as follows:
First, we suppose g0 = gυ, h0 = gν .
– Public parameters PK generated by Setup
PK = (h1, . . . , h2n, Y ).
1. {νti}i∈U , representing hi = hti0 = gνti .
2. {νtn+i}i∈U , representing hi = htn+i0 = gνti .
– Private key components given by KeyGen. Let skj be the j-th queried private key
for the attribute set ωj .
skj =


























We note that in the actual game, the values of the formal variables are chosen uni-
formly at random in Zp. Two distinct functions may in that case evaluate to the same
value. The simulation is faithful to the standard interaction in a generic group, except
in the event that two of the distinct functions evaluate to the same value on a random
assignment to the formal variables. For any two distinct functions of the form listed
above, the probability of this happening is at most O(q)/p, since the degree of distinct
multivariate polynomials is at mostO(q). Since this probability is negligible, we ignore
this case.
Now the adversary outputs a purported new private key sk∗ for a new attribute
set ω∗ with a suitable decryption algorithm Dec∗(·). We first observe that to decrypt a
ciphertextCT encrypted with an access structure A =
∧
i∈W i, whereW is equal to or a
subset of ω∗. The new private key sk∗ should contain a group element for each attribute
to pair the corresponding group element Ei (or E′i) in the ciphertext in bilinear map for
Y r = e(g0, h0)
αr. We denote these group elements by D∗i and the necessary structure
of the new private key can be presented as (ω∗, {D∗i }i∈U ). On the other hand, as long
as the new private key satisfies the winning conditions the adversary can construct the
new key sk∗ the way it wants to make it look different, which means the adversary can
construct the new private key componentD∗i using a linear combination of the functions
listed above.
Here, we note that if the adversary tries to construct D∗i using any functions other
than D(j)i , then using this part of D
∗
i in bilinear map will result in meaningless group
element in GT for decryption, which also needs to be eliminated by computing it sep-
arately; since it needs to be eliminated afterwards, we do not include it in following
discussion.
WLOG, we assume the new private key sk∗ contains the following least structure
for each attribute i:
D∗i = πi(D
(1)
i , . . . , D
(q)


























i , . . . , D
(q)






βi,2 · · · (D(q)i )βi,q represents a function
in G using components D(j)i from queried private keys.



































The rest of our proof proceeds by assuming the new private key sk∗ satisfies the
conditions above, and obtaining a contradiction: that the new private key sk∗ can be
used to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with a queried attribute set ωj which contradicts











i = α for j ∈ [q]
and x(j)i is uniformly random chosen in Zp, we have
β1,j = β2,j = · · · = βn,j .
We denote them by βj .









Since x(j)i is uniformly random chosen in Zp, it can be concluded that
if ∃i ∈ ω∗ and i /∈ ωj , βj = 0
which is equivalent to
if βj 6= 0, ω∗ ⊆ ωj .















i = 0. Since x
(j)
i is uniformly random chosen in Zp, it
can be concluded that
if ∃i /∈ ω∗ and i ∈ ωj , βj = 0
which is equivalent to
if βj 6= 0, ωj ⊆ ω∗.
So ω∗ equals to a queried attribute set ωj , which results in either the adversary
cannot generate a new key as ω∗ 6= ωj for j ∈ [q] or the new key will be able to decrypt
ciphertexts encrypted with ωj as well since only one queried private key skj can be
used. Therefore, our assumptions cannot be true. The adversary cannot successfully
generate a new private key sk∗ to win the game. 
